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Order Enjoining Future Defamatory Web Comments is Unlawful Prior Restraint
The California Court of Appeal has ruled that an injunction prohibiting a woman from posting “false and defamatory statements and/or confidential personal information” about her ex-husband online was an unconstitutional prior restraint on her free speech rights.
Thomas Evans sued his former wife, Linda Evans for harassment, defamation, and invasion of privacy. He sought and was granted a preliminary injunction against Linda, which enjoined her from publishing “false and defamatory statements” and “confidential personal information” about Thomas on the Internet. This was later reversed by the Court of Appeal, which ruled that it was overbroad, vague, and an unconstitutional prior restraint before trial.
A “prior restraint” is an injunction that “forbids a citizen from speaking in advance of the time the communication is to occur.” It is considered to be “the most serious and the least tolerable infringement” on the First Amendment right to free speech, and is considered to presumptively violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
An order prohibiting a party from making or publishing false statements is an unconstitutional prior restraint. The only exception to this rule is if an order was issued after a trial and the order prohibits the defendant from repeating specific statements found at trial to be defamatory. Thus, under these principles, Linda cannot be prohibited from making alleged false statements until there has been a trial and a determination on the merits that the statements were defamatory.
A prohibition against the disclosure of confidential information also constitutes prior restraint. However, since the disclosure of confidential information could lead to the violation of an individual’s privacy rights, an order of prior restraint may be permissible under certain “compelling or extraordinary” circumstances. In determining whether such circumstances exist, courts generally apply a balancing test, weighing the competing privacy and free speech constitutional rights.
The Court of Appeal found that it could not properly undertake a balancing test, as the use of the phrase “confidential personal information” in the preliminary injunction order was too vague and ambiguous. In addition, an injunction must clearly define the prohibited conduct, and the reference to “confidential personal information” did not provide Linda with a reasonable basis to understand what she was prohibited from placing on the Internet.
For additional information and a copy of the decision, visit: