The California Supreme Court has ruled that an ex-Intel worker, Koursoh Hamidi, did not trespass on the company's computer systems when he emailed thousands of messages to Intel's employees. Specifically, Hamidi together with others formed an organization called Former and Current Employees of Intel (FACE-Intel) to disseminate information and views critical of Intel's employment and personnel policies and practices. Over a 21-month period Hamidi, on behalf of FACE-Intel, sent six mass e-mails to Intel employees. Amongst other things, the messages criticized Intel's employment practices and solicited employees' participation in FACE-Intel. Hamidi breached no computer security barriers in sending the emails and he did remove from his mailing list any recipient who so desired. Also, Hamidi's communications to individual Intel employees caused neither physical damage nor functional disruption to the company's computers, nor did they at any time deprive Intel of the use of its computers.
The Supreme Court of California concluded that "under California law the tort [of trespass to chattels] does not encompass, and should not be extended to encompass, an electronic communication that neither damages the recipient computer system nor impairs its functioning." In particular, the Court stated that "Intel's claim fails not because e-mail transmitted through the Internet enjoys unique immunity, but because the trespass to chattels tort may not, in California , be proved without evidence of an injury to the plaintiff's personal property or legal interest. The Court differentiated this case and spam mail sent to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) by showing that ISPs and their clients do suffer from unsolicited commercial bulk email.
In addressing the consequential economic damages claim raised by Intel, the Court stated that Intel's claimed losses, i.e., loss of productivity caused by employees reading and reacting to Hamidi's messages and company efforts to block the messages, "is not an injury to the company's interest in its computers-which worked as intended and were unharmed by the communications-any more than the personal distress caused by reading an unpleasant letter would be an injury to the recipient's mailbox, or the loss of privacy caused by an intrusive telephone call would be an injury to the recipient's telephone equipment."
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